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This study examines whether political empowerment 
of women affects their economic participation. In the 
context of mandated political representation reform 
for women in India, the study finds that the length of 
exposure to women politicians affects overall female labor 
force participation. These effects seem to arise through 
direct and indirect channels: political representation 
of women directly affects hours of work assigned to 
women under the recent national public works program, 
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
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Guarantee Scheme. In addition, the level of access to 
public goods, as influenced by exposure to women leaders 
over time, increases the likelihood of women being 
engaged in the labor force. The findings suggest that 
women’s participation in politics could be a useful policy 
tool to increase both the supply of and the demand 
for labor market opportunities for women, potentially 
helping to stem India’s declining female labor force 
participation rate.  
Can Political Empowerment Help Economic Empowerment?  
Women Leaders and Female Labor Force Participation in India 
 
Ejaz Ghani, Anandi Mani and Stephen D. O’Connell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Women, gender, jobs, social protection, social inclusion, shared prosperity, 
decentralization, sub-national development, political reservations, development, India, South 
Asia. 
JEL Classification: J16, L26, L60, L80, M13, O10, P16, J15 
Author institutions and contact details: Ghani: World Bank, Eghani@worldbank.org; Mani: 
University of Warwick, a.mani@warwick.ac.uk; O’Connell: CUNY Graduate Center, 
soconnell@gc.cuny.edu. 
Acknowledgments: This paper was prepared with the financial support from World Bank. 
Mehtabul Azam and Mahesh Dahal provided valuable insights regarding NSS data.  We would 
also like to thank Mani Shankar Iyer, Prabir De, Bhisma Rout, and Nupur Tewari for helpful 
discussions on the Panchayat system. Any remaining errors are our own. The views expressed 
here are those of the authors and not of any institution with which they may be associated. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
India has a poor track record on gender equality, even among lower-middle income countries.  
According to the UNDP’s 2013 Gender Inequality Index, India ranks 136th of 186 countries; as 
per World Economic Forum’s 2012 Global Gender Gap Index, it ranks 105th of 135 countries.   
An important contributor to the low status of women in India is their low level of participation in 
the labor force: for instance, the “economic participation and opportunity” subcomponent of the 
Gender Gap Index ranks India 123rd of 135 countries (see Appendix Figure 1).    
This is worrisome on two counts:  economic empowerment is an important aspect of women’s 
bargaining power both within the household and in society at large, and female labor force 
participation (LFP) rates in India have been showing a declining trend in recent years.  
According to the ILO’s Global Employment Trends 2013 report, LFP for women in India has 
gone down from 37 percent in 2004–2005 to 29 percent in 2009–2010.   These figures are much 
lower than the average rate of female LFP across countries, which is around 60% (Bhalla and 
Kaur 2011).  The downward trend in India is especially striking given the huge expansion of 
economic opportunities in India since the liberalization of the economy in 1991.   
There are at least two reasons to care about gender equality.  One is for its own sake.  The other 
is that gender equality can benefit economic development.  While there is some support for the 
view that economic development may itself promote gender equality, evidence from various 
countries suggests that this effect is not strong enough (Duflo 2012).   The figures cited above 
provide evidence for the case of India.  Therefore, continuous, creative, and pro-active policy 
commitment to equality, and specifically to increasing economic opportunities for women, may 
be needed to promote gender equality.  In this paper, we investigate the role of a somewhat 
unconventional policy tool – political empowerment for women – in enhancing economic 
opportunity.  We evaluate the effect of political empowerment of women on female LFP using 
the context of a natural experiment: the phased implementation of a 1993 reform mandating 
political representation (PR) for women in local government.  
In what way(s) may political empowerment of women affect their economic opportunities and 
LFP?  We believe that there are two broad, distinct channels through which this can happen.  The 
first is through direct authority that female political representatives (PRs) and leaders may have 
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in creating employment opportunities at the local level.  For instance, under the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) in India – the world’s largest 
public works program – the village level leader (Sarpanch) has official say in the choice of 
public projects. Apart from this direct channel of influence, women leaders could indirectly 
affect women’s labor market participation.  This may be through the public goods they provide 
or facilitate.  In the Indian context, there is a sizeable body of empirical evidence that shows how 
women leaders affect the provision of public goods that women care about (Chattopadhyay-
Duflo 2004, Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2011, and Iyer et al 2012).  Some of these could also 
increase women’s ability to work outside the home. Alternatively, women PRs could facilitate 
female LFP by gradually changing perceptions of gender roles and attitudes (of both men and 
women) towards women’s participation in the activities outside the home (Beaman et al 2009, 
2012).  (See Section 3 for details on these different channels.)   
We have three key findings:  
• First, longer exposure to female political representation (PR) increases women’s overall 
labor force participation – both from having women as members at all levels of local 
government as well as leaders of district councils.   
• Second, greater exposure to women PRs raises the share of public employment 
opportunities allocated to women under the MGNREGS.   
• Finally, we find evidence that increasing access to public goods that women care about 
(e.g., roads, health) encourages greater female LFP in the presence of women leaders.  
Our findings highlight important complementarities between political and economic 
policy tools to increase women’s labor force participation.   
A typical challenge with examining how elected representatives from minority groups affect 
citizen outcomes is that their election may reflect underlying changes in the preferences of the 
electorate, or their own specific attributes – rather than the effect of their election on the minority 
group as a whole.  In our context however, two features of the 1993 reform help rule out these 
concerns.  First, in decentralizing power to local elected bodies, the 1993 reform (formally, the 
73rd Constitutional Amendment) mandated a minimum proportion (one-third) of elected local 
governance seats to be reserved for women.  In addition, higher-level leadership positions in a 
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third of the local government councils at all levels were reserved for women candidates.  Second, 
the actual implementation of the 1993 law across Indian states happened in a staggered manner 
in the decade following its enactment for reasons largely exogenous to the outcomes of interest 
to the present study (Iyer et al 2012, Ghani et al 2013a).  We therefore use this plausibly 
exogenous variation in the length of exposure to women PRs across different districts of India to 
assess the impact of women’s political empowerment on their LFP and economic opportunities.   
We carry out a cross-district analysis for the year 2009, examining the cumulative impact of 
exposure to women PRs on labor market outcomes.1  We find that longer exposure to women 
PRs increases women’s overall LFP.  This impact comes from having women at all levels of 
government from the introduction of the reform at the state level, but longer exposure to women 
leaders in the district council also has an additional, if smaller impact.  In contrast, we find no 
effect on men’s overall LFP.  In terms of magnitudes, state level introduction of the program 
seems to have the biggest impact on public employment, while district level leaders seem to 
encourage greater household-based self-employment.   
In trying to understand these findings better, we examine evidence for the direct and indirect 
channels outlined above.  We first examine the allocation of work under India’s flagship 
employment guarantee scheme, MGNREGS.  Across all three phases of its implementation since 
the year 2006-07, we find that having had longer exposure to women PRs at the first year of 
implementation of the program directly increases the share of work allotted to women under it.   
In order to study the indirect effects of public good provision by women leaders, we examine 
how the level of access to key public goods, as predicted by the exposure to women leaders, 
affects women’s LFP.  The reasoning for this approach is based on village level evidence that 
having women leaders changes the level and composition of the public goods provided: women 
leaders are more responsive with respect to public goods preferred by women (Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo 2004).  Given that personal safety and security may rightly be regarded as public 
                                                 
1 There are some important arguments in favor of examining the cumulative impact of exposure to women leaders, 
rather than their year-by-year impact.  For one, the inexperience of women leaders may be a barrier to their 
effectiveness in the short term: for instance, there is evidence of capture of program benefits by local elites (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2012) and corruption in the implementation of MGNREGS (Afridi et al 2013).  Whether these short 
term impacts persist over the long run is an important – and ultimately, empirical – issue.  Here, the time that has 
elapsed since the implementation of the reform is long enough in most states, to make it feasible question to 
examine this question.   
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goods that would directly influence a woman’s LFP decision, women leaders’ impact on crime 
outcomes can also affect female LFP (Iyer et al 2012).    
We examine this indirect impact of women leaders on female LFP using a 2SLS approach: 
cumulative exposure to women leaders at the state level up to the year 2001 is used to predict the 
level of key public goods in that year.  We confirm that the length of exposure to women leaders 
affects the level of access to key public goods such as primary health centers, banks, paved roads 
and safe drinking water.  Of these, our second-stage analysis finds that the first three have a 
significant influence on women’s LFP in the year 2004, overall and in specific categories of self-
employment.2   This suggests that women leaders facilitate greater female LFP through indirect 
channels as well.   Taken together, our findings provide encouraging support for the idea that 
women PRs can be a catalyst to improve both the supply of economic opportunities for women 
(through public employment) as well as women’s demand for labor force participation (through 
better public goods). 3 
This study contributes to two specific strands of academic literature. Our work directly connects 
to prior studies of the impact of women’s political reservations in India.  Secondly, it is also 
linked with a literature that examines women’s LFP in developing countries – including the 
declining trend in the Indian context (see Ghani et al 2013b, 2013c, 2013d).   Finally, it also links 
to studies assessing the impact of the effect of MGNREGS on rural labor markets in India (see 
for instance Khera and Nayak 2009). More generally, this work builds upon earlier studies of the 
micro-level effects of policy on household labor supply and occupational choice. Overall we 
contribute to a much larger literature on the role and effect of policy and women’s advancement 
in less-developed countries, as well as wider interest on how to increase the effectiveness of 
social welfare programs in developing economies.   
 
 
                                                 
2 We have used the closest year to the latest available census data on public goods (2001) for which household level 
data on labor force participation is available, i.e. 2004.   
3 We have not explored the impact of women PRs effects as role models on female LFP.  However, Beaman et 
al(2012) do find that they encourage higher levels of education and aspirations for girls’ working outside the home.      
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2.  Women’s Participation in the Labor Force and Politics in India  
2.1 Women’s Socio-Economic Status and Political Representation 
Historically and even today, women remain a disadvantaged section of Indian society. Women 
were significantly underrepresented in political institutions in India, accounting for only 10% of 
the membership of national legislatures in 2009. Over the period 1985-2007, only 5.5% of state 
legislators were women. Women were also significantly disadvantaged in terms of human 
development indicators: in 2007, India had only 940 women for every 1000 men in the 2011 
Census. Only 65% of women in India were literate in 2011, compared with 82% of men.  
2.2 Mandated Political Representation in Local Councils 
At the national level, reservations for women in elected bodies in India originated with the 73rd 
and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts. These Amendments gave national support to the 
formalization and implementation of an historical decentralized governance structure known as 
the panchayat (or, more formally, Panchayati Raj Institutions). Traditionally, panchayats 
operated at the village level and consisted of a small number of individuals chosen by a village to 
oversee a wide range of local affairs. However, panchayats were not standardized in their 
structures, organization, operations, or responsibilities, nor were they necessarily elected bodies. 
By the mid-20th century panchayats were recognized often to embody “concealed forms of 
social prejudice, oppression and exploitation that were firmly rooted in local power structures” 
(GOI 2008). In the latter half of the 20th century there was support for the revival of a reformed 
panchayat system, with some states indeed restructuring their local government systems to 
provide for the decentralized panchayat system. By 1989 there was strong support at the national 
level to give constitutional status to a broad panchayat system.  
In 1993, two pieces of national legislation came into effect: the 73rd Constitutional Amendment 
Act instituted a three-tiered system of local government at the village, sub-district (block), and 
district levels in rural areas of the country, while the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act 
instituted a revised local governance structure in municipalities (hereafter “the Amendments”). 
The Amendments intended to provide large-scale devolution and decentralization of 
administrative powers to local bodies.  Responsibilities of the Panchayat include administration 
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of state transfer programs, planning and implementation of schemes for economic development, 
establishment and administration of local public goods such as educational and medical facilities, 
oversight of local infrastructure (water, sewage, roads, etc.) and the monitoring of civil servants 
(Duflo 2005). Furthermore, the Amendments stipulated that members of the local governance 
bodies were to be elected at five-year intervals, and at least one-third of all seats across the state 
were required to be filled by women.  
The 73rd Amendment made for an ideal natural experiment because of multiple levels of explicit 
and implicit exogenous variation regarding what areas were subject to reservation at a given 
time. First, Gram Panchayats (hereafter referred to as “GPs”; the most local tier of the panchayat 
system, with approximately one GP for each village) were to be randomly subject to the 
reservations on a rotating basis. Thus at the village level, there exists random variation at any 
time regarding which villages were subject to the reservations and which were not. Next, one-
third of a state’s district chairperson seats were to be reserved for women and this reservation is 
also randomly assigned and the assignment rotates across districts.  
Finally, there exists substantial exogenous variation in the state-level timing of the effective 
implementation of the provisions of the 73rd Amendment. The Amendments stipulated that 
states had the responsibility to adjust or amend local elections to comply with the provisions of 
the Amendments, and all states amended existing laws or passed new laws to be compliant 
within one year of the passing of the Amendments. Compliant elections were eventually held by 
most states/union territories (UTs), and there is considerable variation in the timing of “effective 
implementation” (i.e., the first election held which implemented the provisions of the 
Amendments) across states. This implementation timing varies exogenously primarily due to 
state authorities waiting for the term of existing elected local governing bodies to expire before 
conducting compliant elections.  This has resulted in largely exogenous variation in the length of 
exposure to women PRs across states.4 
                                                 
4 In other cases, implementation timing varied perhaps less exogenously. Some states chose to incorporate 
provisions regarding political reservations for women prior to when the constitutional amendment was to come into 
effect. Andhra Pradesh provided for 22 to 25 percent reservations for women in the Andhra Pradesh Gram 
Panchayats Act, 1964 (GOI 2008). Karnataka introduced a similar level of reservation for women in 1985. Both 
Kerala and West Bengal restructured their institutions of local government before the passing of the 73rd Act (in 
1991 and 1992, respectively) although elections implementing these reservations were not held until after national 
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3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Data on Political Representation for Women 
We exploit two types of variation in exposure to women leaders to identify the effect of PRs on 
labor force participation. The first captures cross-state differences in the timing of when the 73rd 
Amendment provisions were implemented. This information was collected from several 
publications documenting the implementation and progress of the reservations (Mathew 1995, 
2000; GOI 2008); Appendix Table 1 depicts the considerable variation in timing of effective 
implementation of the Panchayati Raj across states/UTs. 
The second level of identifying variation measures district-level chairperson reservations.5 That 
is, one-third of district council chairperson (“Sarpanch”) positions in India were also reserved for 
women, and this reservation rotates across districts. While all districts within a state have an 
identical (one-third) fraction of their council membership reserved for women, they do differ at a 
given point in time whether the chairperson position is reserved for women, and differ over time 
as to how many election cycles the Sarpanch position has been reserved for a woman.   
3.2 Data on Labor Market Outcomes and Public Employment 
The primary data source for labor force outcomes used in our analysis is India’s National Sample 
Survey Organization’s “Socio-Economic Survey—Schedule 10: Employment and 
Unemployment” (hereafter referred to as “NSS”). The NSS data contain a representative sample 
of households across all states/UTs approximately every five years (“thick” rounds).6 We use 
data from the thick rounds conducted in fiscal years 1999-2000, 2004-05, 2007-08 and 2009-10 
(hereafter referred to only by the initial year for simplicity). The village sampling frame comes 
from the most recent national population census, and the sample is stratified across households at 
the district-rural/urban level.   
                                                                                                                                                             
enforcement in 1993. Bihar was prevented from implementation due to legal issues regarding certain provisions of 
the Amendments (Iyer et al, 2012). Some states (Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland) were explicitly excluded from 
the purview of the Amendments (GOI 2008). Jammu and Kashmir introduced reservations at a level consistent with 
the Amendments via state-level legislation in 1997, although the election of panchayats under its own Act has not 
yet taken place (GOI 2008). Jharkhand has similarly never held reserved elections. 
5 These data are available from the publisher of Iyer et al (2012). 
6 The NSS’ “thin” or small rounds are conducted on a more frequent basis, although their smaller sample makes 
them less comparable to the thick rounds and less viable in empirical analysis also containing thick rounds. 
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Respondent households provide individual-level details regarding employment, income and 
consumption particulars. Our analysis focuses on reported occupational categories of working-
age (25 to 60 year-old) women and men in both rural and urban areas of the country. In 
particular, we exploit the variation in individual-level responses to a question on one’s “usual 
principal activity,” which can take the following categorical values:  
• Household enterprise/self-employed: own account worker, own account employer, helper 
in household enterprise; 
• Salaried or wage employees (no subfields); 
• Casual wage labor: in public works, in other types of work; 
• Unemployed: did not work but was seeking and/or available for work; 
• Other categories of workers outside the labor force: attended to domestic duties only, 
attended to domestic duties and was also engaged in collection of goods for household 
use, attended an educational institution, and other miscellaneous categories outside the 
labor force.   
For our empirical analysis, we do not consider individuals reporting a currently-enrolled status or 
in the other miscellaneous categories of activity. Due to changes in administrative boundaries 
over time we concord district and state definitions to be consistent over time. Our analysis covers 
data from 418 unique consistently-defined districts across 32 states/UTs (pre-2001 definitions).  
Using the sample weights provided with the data, we construct population-level estimates of 
workers in each of the subcategories by rural/urban district areas in each period. MGNREGS and 
Panchayati Raj information is then matched in using geographical location data available in NSS. 
This data set becomes the basis for our analyses to follow.  We also use data on the fraction of 
district population with access to various public goods from the 2001 Population Census.   
Table 1a characterizes national trends in men’s and women’s labor force participation across 
rural and urban areas for our main period of study (1999-2009). These highlight, in particular, 
how women’s LFP has shown an interesting downward trend in recent years, as well as sharp 
differences (both in level and in trends) in urban and rural areas of the country.  We note that 
much of this downward trend is in rural areas, with hardly any change in urban areas over this 
period.   
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For ease of comparison, we present the category-wise share of employment in each year in Table 
1b. This highlights two patterns: there is a high concentration among men in own-account-
enterprise (OAE) work,7 and there is a sharp distinction between the activities that men and 
women are engaged in. For example, more than 60 percent of women are primarily engaged in 
domestic duties, whereas this share is trivial among men. Women also have a higher likelihood 
of being casual workers in small-scale enterprises, whereas men are more likely found as (paid) 
workers and employers in own account enterprises. A low percentage of both groups is primarily 
engaged in public works, although the share of men in this activity is typically slightly higher 
than that of women. Over time, we notice very little change in the distribution of employment 
across categories for men, but for women there is an observed decrease in the share of OAE 
casual workers (-2.4 percentage points), and a sizeable increase (5.4 percent) in the share of 
women primarily engaged in domestic work. In terms of rural-urban differences, we highlight 
the reduction in the share of individuals engaged in wage/salary work and a higher percentage in 
OAE employment, pointing to the higher percentage of formal-sector jobs in urban areas. 
Women in rural areas are somewhat less likely to be engaged principally in domestic duties 
(relative to all women), and slightly more likely to be engaged in the OAE sector. Figures 1-3 
depict these levels and trends in overall labor force participation for rural areas graphically by 
state for 1999-2009.  
Table 2 presents population-level estimates of employment in each of the categories of 
employment we study. Here we confirm from the micro data some important priors: a large 
increase in the number of individuals engaged in public works following the introduction of 
MGNREGS, especially in rural areas, and sharp gender differences in the distribution of 
employment across activity types.  Given that the biggest change in female LFP in recent years is 
in rural areas, we will focus our formal analysis on this part of the country alone.   
 
 
                                                 
7 Own-account enterprises are specifically defined in the context of GOI surveys as “self-employed who operate 
their enterprises on their own account or with one or a few partners and who during the reference period by and 
large, run their enterprise without hiring any labour. They may, however, have unpaid helpers to assist them in the 
activity of the enterprise.” 
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3.3 Empirical Strategy 
We aggregate the data (using sampling weights) by district, location (rural/urban) and sex to 
estimate the following cross-sectional specification that examines how labor market outcomes at 
the district level are affected by the length of exposure to mandated political representation for 
women.   
 ln 𝐿𝑠,𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑠,𝑖 + +𝛽3𝑋𝑠,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑖 (1)  
Ls,i captures the log-count of individuals in a given labor market activity in state s and district i of 
in 2009. Es represents the number of years of exposure to mandated political representation for 
women under Panchayati Raj since its implementation at the state level, Ds,i captures the 
cumulative number of years in which the district chairperson seat was reserved for a woman, and 
Xs,i  represents district specific controls including the initial (1999) value of the left hand-side 
variable.8  Equation (1) is estimated separately for men and women and standard errors are 
clustered at the state level.  We estimate this equation using NSS data from 2009-10 to allow for 
the longest possible time since the introduction of Panchayati Raj to assess its impact; this year 
choice for the data also guarantees at least some exposure to PR across as many districts in our 
sample as possible.  
The 1993 reform, as it pertained to rural and urban areas, is legislated under the 73rd and 74th 
amendments respectively.  Given that there was considerable variation in the actual 
implementation of the 73rd Amendment we estimate the equation above using data from rural 
areas only.  As explained in section 2.1, the date of implementation of this reform varied across 
different states of India, but for reasons unrelated to women’s LFP and employment patterns in 
these states. Therefore, the number of years of exposure to women political representatives is 
arguably exogenous to female employment patterns. We exploit this variation in exposure to 
women political representatives both at the state and the district level, given that they imply 
different comparison margins.  For the districts within a given state, variation in exposure to the 
program is only with respect to the presence of a woman Sarpanch (leader) of the district 
                                                 
8 We are constrained to use 1999 as our “initial” year for this analysis due to the fact that the data available for 
purchase from the NSSO for the previous household survey  round (conducted in 1993-94) do not contain district-
identifying information.   
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council.  In contrast, variation at the state level implies differences in exposure to both women 
leaders as well as women members of the councils at all levels of local government.   
4. Political Representation and Women’s Labor Market Outcomes  
4.1. Women’s Labor Force Participation 
We report our results from estimating equation 1 for men and women in Table 3, for both overall 
LFP and specific labor force activities.  Part (A) of the table shows the impact on women’s LFP, 
while part (B) depicts the effects on men’s LFP.  Column (1) shows the impact of women PRs on 
overall female LFP.  We find that an additional year of exposure to women PRs across all levels 
of local government increases women’s LFP by 17.5% (row 1); in addition, having a woman 
leader at the district level improves this outcome by 8.8% (row 2).  Both findings are statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  In contrast, women PRs have little impact on men’s LFP.    
In terms of individual types of work, district women leaders seem to significantly increase 
women’s self-employment (worker in OAE) opportunities by 17% while the broader impact of 
having women PRs is seen in an 18.7% increase in wage and salaried work.  At both levels of 
analysis, women PRs have positive effects of fairly large magnitude on female public 
employment, although these effects are not statistically significant.   They also lower the 
percentage of women exclusively involved in domestic work.   
In order to examine these effects in greater detail, it is worth understanding the factors that 
constrain women’s LFP in the Indian context, and discuss potential channels through which 
women PRs can change these constraints directly or indirectly.  To do so, we draw on existing 
research.   
4.2 How Women Political Representatives Could Affect Female LFP: Possible Channels 
What are the factors that affect a woman’s decision to seek work outside the home, in the Indian 
context – and what are the big barriers she faces?  Recent field surveys in India (Khera-Nayak 
2009, Narayanan 2007, Krishnaraj et al 2004) highlight some key factors relevant to our 
analysis:  Most household duties are entirely a woman’s responsibility, hence proximity of the 
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work site is one important consideration.  Concerns about personal safety and exploitation as 
well as the availability of child care are two more critical factors.  If these requirements are not 
fully met, women are understandably unwilling to take up work outside the home, especially 
given that women are widely discriminated against, when it comes to wage rates.  On top of 
these factors, women also face considerable social barriers that make it ‘inappropriate’ for them 
to undertake certain types of work.   
In what ways may woman leaders change the outcomes of these key decision variables, so as to 
influence other women’s decision to seek work?  Recent work shows that women are more likely 
to attend village meetings and voice their concerns (Beaman et al 2009) when there are women 
in local leadership positions.  To the extent that women care about employment opportunities, 
they may be more likely to raise this issue when there are women holding leadership positions.  
If a woman leader has a role in the choice of projects that are undertaken in public employment 
schemes – as is true under India’s MGNREGS program, at the village level – and cares about 
employment opportunities for women, this may directly influence women’s employment 
opportunities.  In the Indian context, this is most likely to be seen in public sector employment, 
given that the village Sarpanch has a say in the choice of projects under MGNREGS, India’s 
largest employment guarantee scheme.   
There are many potential channels by which women leaders may have an indirect influence on 
women’s LFP. First, women leaders have been found to be more likely to invest in infrastructure 
for public goods that women express a preference for (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). The 
easier availability of these public goods could affect women’s LFP through greater convenience 
and/or time savings.  Women leaders may encourage greater labor force participation if they can 
affect physical safety (Iyer et al 2012).  They may also serve as local role models (Beaman et al 
2012), hence change perceptions about the suitability of certain jobs for women and thereby 
influence their education and labor market decision.  
The effect of women PRs on female employment in public works reported in Table 3 (part (A), 
column (2)-row (1)) is consistent with the first (direct) channel described above.   The increase in 
women’s LFP in self-employment due to the presence of women leaders at the district level is 
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more consistent with the second (indirect) channel described above (column(3), row (2)) – given 
that district leaders do not have a say in the choice of public employment projects.  
4.3 Public Sector Employment under Women Leaders  
We now examine evidence for the direct channel by which women leaders influence the share of 
work allocated to women in public works.  For this, we use data from India’s main public 
employment program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(MGNREGS) – which is the largest existing public employment program in the world.  We use 
data from district-level Implementation Status Reports collected from the MGNREGS website.9  
These data report person-days worked by sex, which we use to construct the percentage of total 
person-days worked by women in a given district and year.   
The identifying variation in our analysis comes from state-level cross-sectional differences in the 
cumulative length of exposure to women leaders in the 73rd Amendment. Thus we use a cross-
sectional specification similar to equation 1 with the outcome as the share of person-days of 
work allocated to women in the first year in which MGNREGS was implemented in each district. 
Given the phased implementation of MGNREGS, our data for individual districts comes from 
the years 2006, 2007 or 2008, with each district appearing once. Because the phasing in of 
MGNREGS was not random across districts, we also estimate this specification separately by 
MGNREGS implementation phase to avoid correlation between the measure of cumulative years 
and the phasing selection criteria.  In this context, it is useful to note that all districts within a 
state were not phased into the program at the same time.   
Table 4 presents the results of these estimations.  It shows that longer exposure to women leaders 
results in a larger share of work under MGNREGS being allocated to women: an additional year 
of exposure to women leaders as of the time of MGNREGS implementation increased the share 
of work allotted to women by 1.2 percentage points on average (column 1). Given that exposure 
to women leaders as of the MGNREGS initial implementation year ranged from zero to 20 (with 
a mean of 11 years), the magnitude of this impact is quite large relative to the mean share of 
person-days allocated to women (35 percent).  That is, we would estimate that the average 
                                                 
9 See: http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/mpr_ht/nregampr.aspx  
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district with 11 years of exposure to women PRs at the time of the introduction of MGNREGS 
would have a 13 percentage-point higher share (35 percent) of MGNREGS work allocated to 
women in the first year under the program, than a a state that had zero exposure (22 percent).  
Khera-Nayak (2009) document several features of MGNREGS which make it an attractive 
employment option for women. For one, work is locally available (within a 5 km radius, as 
stipulated under the program) and its availability is predictable.  For another, the work is 
regarded as ‘dignified’ for women to undertake, and there is less chance of it being exploitative.  
To top these factors, it is also better paid (Azam 2011).  Survey respondents consistently report 
several related benefits from being able to undertake this work.  To the extent that women 
leaders at the village level significantly facilitate greater female employment under MGNREGS, 
they provide a direct channel of economic empowerment for women.   
4.4 Effect of Access to Public Goods under Women Leaders on Women’s LFP 
Next, we examine evidence on one of the indirect channels described above: how women leaders 
affect women’s lifestyle through the public goods they prioritize.  There is some concrete 
evidence of this in the Indian context: Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that female leaders 
in local government increased access to public goods desired by women; Iyer et al(2012) find 
that they encourage greater reporting of crimes by women too, which would affect women’s 
sense of safety in seeking work outside their homes.  
We estimate the impact of exposure to women PRs through the provision of public goods by 
estimating the following equation:  
 ln 𝐿𝑠,𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑠,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑠,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑖 (2)  
where Ls,i captures labor force participation in district i in state s in the year 2004, as a function 
of the fraction of areas with access to public good Ps,i in district i in state s in the year 2001 and 
Xs,i represents district level controls including the initial value of the dependent variable (in the 
year 1999).  To estimate this equation, we take a 2SLS approach.  We use cumulative years of 
exposure to women leaders by district up to the year 2001 as an instrument to predict the fraction 
of the population with access to key public goods in that year.   
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We then examine how female LFP in the year 2004 is affected by the predicted value of various 
public goods, generated from the first stage regression.  We are able to confirm that the length of 
exposure to women PRs does influence access to a range of public goods, including primary 
health centers, banks, paved roads and safe drinking water.  (Please refer to the Appendix for the 
results of this first stage regression.)  As seen in Table 5, our second stage analysis finds that 
access to the first three public goods – primary health centers, paved roads, and banks – has a 
significant influence on women’s LFP in the year 2004.  This is true with respect to overall 
female LFP as well as in specific categories of self-employment.10   While more work is needed 
to unpack the mechanisms underlying the findings reported here, these findings are very 
encouraging in terms of one type of indirect channel through which women leaders have affected 
women’s LFP. 11   
5. Conclusion 
Women’s earning power is well recognized to be an important aspect of their bargaining power 
within and outside the household.  However, labor market participation of women may be 
curtailed in societies where women have traditionally held second-class status – due to both 
supply and demand side constraints.  Typical policy initiatives to encourage women’s LFP tend 
to be in the form of those that expand job opportunities for women.  This paper explores whether 
political empowerment of women could be a novel policy tool to enhance labor force 
participation by mitigating demand-side constraints.   Understanding a woman’s LFP decision at 
the micro level requires a keen appreciation for the various factors, social, economic, logistical 
and psychological, that influence it.  Women in public office may be in a unique position to 
appreciate these multi-dimensional barriers – and ways to mitigate them, either through active 
efforts or by serving as catalysts for change.    
We study this link between political and economic empowerment in the context of mandated 
political representation for women reform in India in 1993, taking advantage of cross-district and 
state level variation in the length of exposure to different elements of this reform (due to varying 
                                                 
10 We have used the closest year to the latest available census data on public goods (2001) for which household level 
data on labor force participation is available, i.e. 2004.   
11 While there is an effect of one particular public good (the primary health center) on men’s LFP as employers in 
self-owned enterprises, there is little impact of the other public goods, or in any other form of LFP.     
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implementation dates).  Using representative household-level employment data, we find that 
longer exposure to women PRs significantly increases women’s LFP.  We explore possible 
channels through which this effect may arise.  We find evidence of both a direct channel 
(whereby women PRs allocate more employment to women in public works) and indirect 
channels (whereby women leaders at the district level facilitate/encourage greater female LFP 
through the public goods they provide).   
Our findings are directly relevant to the current debate on policies for empowerment of women 
in developing countries. They are also especially pertinent to address the problem of declining 
labor force participation of women in India in the last decade – despite the huge expansion in 
economic activity since the liberalization of the economy in the 1990s.  They are encouraging, 
inasmuch as they suggest that public works programs may be a natural way for women PRs to 
leverage their political power for women’s economic empowerment through a greater supply of 
job opportunities.  They also provide some suggestive evidence that women leaders may be 
catalysts for greater female demand for LFP because of their emphasis on the provision of public 
goods preferred by women.    
In future work, we will aim to gather additional relevant data to refine this analysis.  For one, we 
will compare the effects of women leaders on female LFP at the within-district level, before 
versus after the reform.  We will also modify our analysis of how public good provision by 
women leaders affects women’s LFP, by obtaining initial levels of public good provision at the 
district level for an initial year prior to the enactment of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment.   
We will also examine how our current findings on public good provision and female LFP are 
modified by using district (rather than state)-level exposure to women leaders as our instrument.   
Overall, our findings so far justify a broader discussion of the ways in which political 
participation of women can be leveraged to enhance their economic empowerment.   
Understanding these channels is a key to increasing female LFP and unleashing India’s potential 
in the global economy.   
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Table 1: Share of persons engaged, by labor force activity
by sex and year, 1999-2009
Rural Urban
1999-00 2004-05 2007-08 2009-10 1999-00 2004-05 2007-08 2009-10
Labor Force Participation, men 99.7% 99.7% 99.6% 99.7% 99.6% 99.6% 99.5% 99.6%
Labor Force Participation, women 42.6% 45.2% 39.6% 36.5% 22.6% 25.3% 21.1% 21.6%
OAE worker, men 43.0% 46.4% 44.1% 43.2% 35.0% 37.4% 35.7% 34.9%
OAE worker, women 5.6% 6.5% 5.1% 5.2% 4.7% 4.9% 4.4% 4.7%
OAE employer, men 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.0% 1.1% 2.3% 2.1% 1.7%
OAE employer, women 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
OAE casual worker, men 8.6% 9.5% 8.8% 8.5% 4.5% 5.3% 5.0% 4.8%
OAE casual worker, women 15.0% 18.2% 14.6% 12.5% 3.7% 4.8% 3.2% 2.9%
Wage/salary worker, men 10.0% 9.7% 9.7% 9.0% 41.3% 39.7% 40.4% 40.7%
Wage/salary worker, women 1.8% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 8.0% 9.3% 8.1% 8.4%
Employer in public works, men 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4%
Employer in public works, women 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
"Other" employment, men 35.8% 32.0% 34.8% 36.8% 15.1% 12.8% 14.4% 15.9%
"Other" employment, women 19.6% 17.1% 17.2% 15.8% 5.3% 4.6% 4.7% 4.5%
Attended domestic duties only, men 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4%
Attended domestic duties only, women 57.4% 54.8% 60.4% 63.5% 77.4% 74.7% 78.9% 78.4%
Source: National Sample Survey Employment-Unemployment Survey (Rounds 55, 61, 64, 66)
Table considers working-age population only. All means use sampling weights provided by NSS.
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Table 2a: Total persons engaged, by usual principal activity (000s)
Population estimates, Rural areas
Men Women
Activity 1999 2004 2007 2009 Activity 1999 2004 2007 2009
OAE worker 56,185 66,209 66,619 67,071 OAE worker 7,387 9,495 7,901 8,176
OAE employer 1,505 1,781 1,988 1,530 OAE employer 218 331 301 283
OAE casual worker 11,240 13,533 13,320 13,123 OAE casual worker 19,689 26,393 22,677 19,675
Wage/Salary employee 13,002 13,823 14,629 13,984 Wage/Salary employee 2,384 3,142 3,246 3,111
Employed in public works 287 206 260 995 Employed in public works 81 87 107 614
Employed (all other) 46,728 45,606 52,584 57,132 Employed (all other) 25,755 24,786 26,689 24,967
Domestic duties 343 412 619 458 Domestic duties 75,269 79,578 94,006 100,165
Table 2b: Total persons engaged, by usual principal activity
Population estimates, Urban areas
Men Women
Activity 1999 2004 2007 2009 Activity 1999 2004 2007 2009
OAE worker 14,749 17,516 18,484 19,537 OAE worker 1,851 2,189 2,229 2,573
OAE employer 475 1,061 1,087 939 OAE employer 33 62 54 55
OAE casual worker 1,889 2,467 2,573 2,666 OAE casual worker 1,471 2,142 1,608 1,589
Wage/Salary employee 17,427 18,609 20,899 22,806 Wage/Salary employee 3,163 4,208 4,102 4,572
Employed in public works 109 56 62 230 Employed in public works 17 14 3 35
Employed (all other) 6,369 6,016 7,451 8,905 Employed (all other) 2,099 2,073 2,403 2,438
Domestic duties 151 172 233 208 Domestic duties 30,645 33,661 40,050 42,505
Source: National Sample Survey Employment-Unemployment Survey (Rounds 55, 61, 64, 66)
Table considers working-age population only. All means use sampling weights provided by NSS.
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Table 3A:  Effects of Women Political Representatives on District-level Labor Market outcomes of Women
Dependent Variable (persons engaged, in natural log): in labor force public worker worker in OAE employer in 
OAE
casual worker 
OAE
wage-salaried domestic work 
only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10)
Cumulative Years of Reserved Elections 0.175+ 0.219 0.038 0.157 0.117 0.187+ -0.009
(0.079) (0.127) (0.097) (0.198) (0.077) (0.086) (0.012)
(mean) cum_wdistres 0.088+ 0.139 0.171++ 0.025 0.030 0.042 -0.023+
(0.045) (0.104) (0.073) (0.090) (0.121) (0.072) (0.010)
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
R-squared 0.279 0.241 0.102 0.240 0.138 0.052 0.673
Adjusted R-squared 0.267 0.229 0.087 0.227 0.124 0.036 0.668
Table 3B:  Effects of Women Political Representatives on District-level Labor Market outcomes of Men
Dependent Variable (persons engaged, in natural log): in labor force public worker worker in OAE employer in 
OAE
casual worker 
OAE
wage-salaried domestic work 
only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10)
Cumulative Years of Reserved Elections 0.003 -0.009 0.358+++ -0.036 0.072+ -0.054 -0.031
(0.008) (0.015) (0.061) (0.032) (0.036) (0.094) (0.093)
(mean) cum_wdistres -0.008 -0.001 0.016 -0.046 0.011 -0.051 0.013
(0.008) (0.011) (0.102) (0.063) (0.028) (0.122) (0.140)
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
R-squared 0.830 0.575 0.159 0.294 0.212 0.014 0.015
Adjusted R-squared 0.827 0.568 0.145 0.282 0.199 -0.002 -0.001
Notes: State clustered standard errors reported below coefficients. Constant term and lag (1999) DV suppressed.
+ significant at 10% level; ++ significant at 5% level; +++ significant at 1% level.
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Table 4:  How Exposure to Women PRs affects Share of NREGS Work 
Allocated to Women, 2006-2008
All Districts Phase I Phase II Phase III
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative Years of Reserved Elections 0.012++ 0.013+++ 0.006 0.014+++
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 593 198 126 269
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.086 0.012 0.066
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state. Constant term (all models) and phase fixed effects (column 1) suppressed.
Similar results hold when outcome variable is in natural logs.
+ significant at 10% level; ++ significant at 5% level; +++ significant at 1% level.
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Table 5:  How Access To Public Goods Under Women PRs Affects Female Labor Force Participation, 2004 
Overall LFP Worker in OAE Employer in OAE Overall LFP Worker in OAE Employer in OAE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary Health Sub-centre 4.354+++ 6.634+++ 5.529+++ 0.535 0.675 10.809+++
(1.513) (2.192) (1.858) (0.431) (1.027) (4.179)
Banks 6.219++ 10.911++ 9.009++ 0.889 1.161 16.171
(3.053) (5.379) (4.473) (0.878) (1.964) (10.372)
Paved Roads 3.350++ 5.605+ 4.860++ 0.590 0.677 9.893
(1.579) (2.898) (2.427) (0.692) (1.187) (6.313)
Safe Drinking Water 17.859 17.276 14.298 9.961 5.022 27.513
(13.99) (11.339) (9.792) (26.334) (8.360) (20.933)
Electricity 3.403 5.626 5.207 0.345 0.468 9.455
(2.332) (4.204) (3.492) (0.366) (0.863) (7.034)
Number of Observations in Each Cell 416 416 416 416 416 416
+ significant at 10% level; ++ significant at 5% level; +++ significant at 1% level.
Women Men
Dependent Variable:
Notes:  Each cell is the main coefficient from a second-stage cross-district IV regression, where the independent variable is the predicted value from a first stage 
regression with the 'Fraction of the District Population that has access to the public good' specified in the corresponding row as the dependent variable and the 
'Cumulative Years of Exposure to Women PRs at the State level in 2001' as the instrument.  The control variable in all specifications is the lag value of the 
dependent LFP variable (as of 1999).  Standard errors are clustered by state.  Appendix Table 2 includes first stage results referred to above.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using NSS data. Maps based on data from rural areas of 
state. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using NSS data. Maps based on data from rural areas of 
state. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using NSS data. Maps based on data from rural areas of 
state. 
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Appendix Table 1: Effective implementation by 
state of political reservations
State
Andhra Pradesh* 1994 1996
Arunachal Pradesh 1997 2003
Assam 1994 2001
Bihar 1993 2001
Chhattisgarh 1997 2005
Goa 1995 2000
Gujarat 1997 1995
Haryana 1994 1995
Himachal Pradesh 1994 1995
Karnataka* 1993 1995
Kerala 1994 1995
Madhya Pradesh 1994 1994
Maharashtra 1994 1997
Manipur 1994 1997
Orissa 1996 1997
Punjab 1994 1998
Rajasthan 1994 1995
Sikkim 1993 1997
Tamil Nadu 1994 1996
Tripura 1994 1994
Uttar Pradesh 1994 1995
Uttarakhand 1994 1996
West Bengal 1993 1993
UTs and States not under purview of 73rd Act Amendment
A&N Islands 1995
Chandigarh 1998
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 1995
Daman & Diu 1995
Lakshadweep 1997
Meghalaya n/a
Mizoram n/a
Nagaland n/a
Delhi n/a
Pondicherry not held
Jharkhand not held
Jammu & Kashmir not held
Year of 73rd 
CAA 
enforcement
First election with 
mandated reservations
Source: Figure 1.1, Study on EWRs in Panchayati Raj Institutions, Ministry of 
Panchayati Raj, GOI (2008). Notes: Table displays implementation of nationally-
mandated political reservations. *: Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka had state-level 
mandated political reservations prior to the Amendments. "n/a" denotes that the 
states of Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland, and the ntaional cpaital territory of 
Delhi are excluded from the purview of the 73rd Amendment. "not held" denotes 
states have not held elections subject to 73rd Amendment provisions up to this 
point.
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Appendix Table 2:  First-stage estimations from Table 5 specifications
Primary Health Sub-centre Banks Paved Roads Safe Drinking Water Electricity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Panel A: Female
Cumulative Years of Reserved Elections 0.014+++ 0.014+++ 0.014+++ 0.010++ 0.008++ 0.009++ 0.018++ 0.016++ 0.016++ 0.003 0.005+ 0.005+ 0.018 0.016 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Lag DV 0.000 0.004 0.007+ -0.008 0.002 0.001 -0.012 0.002 0.014++ 0.012 0.002 0.003++ -0.020 -0.009 0.003
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.016) (0.007) (0.006)
R-squared 0.139 0.145 0.154 0.079 0.070 0.068 0.085 0.077 0.102 0.111 0.060 0.062 0.073 0.066 0.055
Adjusted R-squared 0.135 0.140 0.149 0.074 0.065 0.064 0.080 0.072 0.098 0.107 0.055 0.058 0.068 0.061 0.051
Panel B: Male
Cumulative Years of Reserved Elections 0.015+++ 0.016+++ 0.013+++ 0.009++ 0.009++ 0.009++ 0.014 0.016+ 0.014+ 0.001 0.002 0.005+ 0.023+ 0.023+ 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Lag DV -0.007 -0.016 0.008+ -0.004 -0.006 -0.000 0.025 0.006 0.013+ 0.041++ 0.032+++ 0.002+ -0.073++ -0.076++ 0.001
(0.011) (0.014) (0.004) (0.019) (0.014) (0.003) (0.025) (0.021) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) (0.033) (0.035) (0.007)
R-squared 0.141 0.151 0.175 0.068 0.070 0.068 0.087 0.077 0.124 0.246 0.193 0.067 0.132 0.153 0.055
Adjusted R-squared 0.137 0.147 0.171 0.064 0.065 0.063 0.083 0.073 0.120 0.243 0.189 0.062 0.128 0.149 0.050
Observations (all panels) 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416
+ significant at 10% level; ++ significant at 5% level; +++ significant at 1% level.
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Appendix Figure 1: Women's Economic Participation/Opportunity and Overall Gender 
Gap Index, 2011 
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Overall Gender Gap Index Excluding Economic Participation, 2011
(0= perfect inequality, 1=perfect equality)
mean: 0.69
Source:  Hausmann, Ricardo, Laura D. Tyson and Saadia Zahidi, The Global Gender Gap Report 2011. World Economic Forum. 
Geneva, Switzerland (2011).
